Iraqi official sources have reported the anticipation of an impending visit by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Iraq. The primary purpose of the visit is to address long-standing issues between the two countries, despite the date of the visit not being specified yet. If Erdogan proceeds with this visit, it will mark his first visit to Iraq as the Turkish President since the last visit by a Turkish President, Turgut Ozal, in the late 1980s. However, Erdogan previously visited Iraq twice as Prime Minister during the tenure of former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in 2008 and 2011.
While the water dispute between Baghdad and Ankara, a long-standing issue stretching over seven decades, persists, Iraqi-Turkish relations have taken on a new dimension following the changes in Iraq in 2003.
In 2008, when Iraq was invaded, Turkey refused to allow the United States and its allies to use the Incirlik Turkish base. Instead, Turkey approached the Iraqi issue from multiple angles, much like Iran’s handling of the matter, at a time when Iran-US relations were negative. Both parties utilized Iraqi territory as a battleground for their disputes. Despite Turkey benefiting from its positive relationship with the United States, it distanced itself regarding its agenda in Iraq. While Tehran found allies among the Shia governing political class in Iraq, Ankara has Sunni allies in the same ruling class. Additionally, it is accused of controlling the Turkmen and Kurdish cards in Iraq, through its dealings with the opposition Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), pursuing it within Iraqi borders.
Turkey, accusing Iraq of harboring elements of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) within its territory, has established military bases in several regions of northern Iraq. This move has complicated its relationship with the Kurds in the Kurdistan region, and also with Shia groups that view this as a Turkish occupation of Iraqi lands.
What sets Turkey apart from Iran, which maintains strong relations with all sections of the Iraqi political class (Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish), is its smart use of the economic card. This tool, originally assumed to be a pressure point in Iraq’s hands, has turned into a stronger one for Ankara. Due to the repeated failure of the post-2003 Iraqi political class to establish a national industry capable of meeting local demand at the very least, Iraq has become entirely reliant on first, Turkish exports, and then, Iranian and Chinese ones.
In terms of trade balances, the trade balance between Iraq and Turkey comes first, reaching over 20 billion dollars, followed by Iran. Even though Iran’s relationship with Iraq is broader than Turkey’s in terms of political influence, Turkish goods dominate the Iraqi markets due to their quality compared to Iranian ones. With successive Iraqi governments since 2003 failing to produce dairy products, Turkey has started to compete in the Iraqi markets in this type of industry. Some Iraqi markets have banners saying, “We have Turkish (Arab cheese).”
In conclusion, Erdogan’s impending visit to Iraq could pave the way for a new chapter in Turkish-Iraqi relations, addressing issues related to trade, water disputes, and politics, among others. It presents a significant opportunity for both nations to bolster ties, settle unresolved matters, and explore new avenues of collaboration.
